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What Can the Study of Representation 
Tell Us About Learning? 
K. Ann Renninger 
Susan L. Golbeck 
The "working papers" included in this issue of The Genetic Epistemologist, 
like those of the first issue on Representation and Learning, reflect the 
diversity of questions being addressed by researchers in their efforts to study 
representation and its meaning. Common to all of the papers is the 
assumption that the representation of knowledge is an active construction on 
the part of the individual. This active knower/known relationship may be 
reflected through the efforts of the individual working more or less alone, or 
through co-construction with other individuals. Also common to all four 
papers is the assumption that the structure of representational knowledge 
undergoes change with development, and an adequate theory of learning 
must take this factor into account. 
While all four papers explicitly address representation and learning, the 
problems explored by these authors also differ along at least three 
dimensions. First, the authors are concerned with different domains of 
knowledge. Kaplan, Burgess, and Ginsburg explore factors interacting or 
interfering with children's understanding of mathematics. Beilin and 
Futterweit consider representation in the pictoral domain with a special 
emphasis on photography. Chaille and Freeman examine representation in 
children's play as a function of task. Finally, Winegar uses his work with young 
children's understanding of social process to inform his response to 
discussions of the zone of proximal development. 
A second dimension along which the papers vary is the role of a particular 
theoretical framework in informing the study of representational processes. 
The work of Kaplan et al. has clear roots in both Piagetian and Vygotskian 
theories, although they do not explicitly draw upon a particular theoretical 
framework in their discussion of the connections between the social 
contextual features of the classroom and children's mathematical problem 
solving strategies. Beilin and Futterweit draw on both Piaget and cognitive 
theorists in their discussion of pictoral representation. Chaille and Freeman 
use Piagetian theory to inform their questions about representation in 
preschoolers' play. Finally, Winegar's response reflects a social constructivist 
orientation to development. 
A third feature differentiating these papers concerns contexts for studying 
representation and learning. Kaplan et al. focus on formal learning. Beilin and 
Futterweit focus on learning more generally. Chaille and Freeman intend to 
evaluate the contributions of tasks to children's learning. Finally, Winegar's 
response, while drawing to some extent on his research, is in fact based on his 
sense of current discussions of Vygotskian theory generally, and the zone of 
proximal development in particular. 
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Despite differences between the papers, they also complement each other 
in important ways. Each focuses on representation as a process by which the 
individual organizes or symbolizes information in the service of subsequent 
activity. Moreover, the process of representation is described by each as 
ongoing, constrained by individual experience, and formed, even if indirectly, 
through relationships to others ( others' presentations and/ or re-
presentations). Taken together these papers offer us some ways to begin to 
think about the relation between the study of representation and the way 
individuals learn. 
In the first paper, Kaplan, Burgess, and Ginsburg address the question of 
whether task content in fact reflects the content of students' representations. 
In their videotape study of children's mathematical problem solving, they find 
that representation might be better described "as a system of beliefs, 
attitudes, and strategies that lie at least partially in the domain of social-
cognitive development." They found that much of what children associated 
with mathematics tasks involved pleasing others, not engagement in 
mathematics per se. While their argument is debatable, the cases reviewed 
offer solid support for differences between teachers and students in their 
interpretation of mathematics tasks. This may in fact be particularly true of 
mathematics as a domain in which product, rather than process is often the 
emphasis of classroom practice-not so subtly communicating to students 
the importance of being right. 
The essay on pictorial representation by Beilin and Futterweit offers further 
insights about the mathematics learning discussed by Kaplan et al. In 
particular, their paper suggests that the process of transformation in 
representation cannot be ignored. Even if the mathematical symbols that are 
the focus of the Kaplan et al. study can be considered like photographs to 
represent the particular, one still can be asked whether what the viewer 
(student) sees in the photograph (numbers) is the same as what our own 
phenomenological experience might lead us to expect. This question, as 
Beilin and Futterweit point out, has had a long tradition in psychology. 
Focusing on present day computational theories, they articulate differences 
between theories that are analogous (mimic) and those that are digital 
(symbolic). A basis of each, from their perspective is, however, whether that 
which is depicted (by drawing, photograph, etc.) undergoes a substantive 
transformation in creation and then is once again transformed as another 
attempts to understand it/represents it to him/herself. Thus, rather than 
suggesting that a domain ( such as mathematics or photography) affords a 
particular set of actions, they suggest that representation entails at least two 
transformations. Furthermore, they suggest that the medium of the first 
transformation influences the variance in the second transformation. Such a 
suggestion implies that those working with children on comprehension 
(regardless of whether the subject area is mathematics, graphics, or 
photography) might usefully work with children on deciphering the task at 
hand either by focusing on those instances that are probably truly discrepant 
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for the children ( e.g. abstractions such as duodecohedrans, recursive models, 
or patterns of light) to make the case that the "task" is by definition symbolic, 
or by introducing children to materials that involve increasingly more 
complex transformations relative to the children's present understanding. 
Extending Beilin and Futterweit's ideas to the domain of math further 
suggests that the task of mathematical word problem solving might be 
thought of as a two-step procedure-the first step involving interpretation of 
task demands, the second step involving employment of strategies that allow 
the child to meet those task demands. One approach to working with children 
around such complexity generally involves practice with algorithms, followed 
by work with algorithms nested in word problems. Such an approach 
generally means that children adopt strategies for solving problems ( e.g. 
always adding if the word "and" appears in the sentence), many of which do 
not generalize across problems. Based on the conception of transformations, 
it seems reasonable to think about breaking children's work with 
mathematics into parts-first working with the child around the numbers as 
symbols ( not something to be memorized, rather something to be 
understood), and then working with the child around the relation between 
these symbols whether this involves words or not. 
Another tact for working with children to develop representational 
competence involves specific attention to the manipulability of the tasks 
themselves. This in some ways is quite similar to the first transformation to 
which Beilin and Futterweit refer, as well as to the process through which one 
might work with children to understand nwnbers as symbols. As Sigel ( 1986) 
has pointed out, the first step in the process of understanding rules of 
transformation is "conservation of meaning." The child needs to understand 
that the three-dimensional representation of the object and the picture of the 
object retain a common identity. Once understood, the child then begins 
developing the capability to anticipate, to use hindsight to think about 
alternative action and/ or to transcend the given task. 
The Chaille and Freeman paper describes a project in which the authors are 
studying young children's transformations with apparently simple 
manipulables such as playdough and construction toys. In their work they are 
studying the role of social context-the immediate playmates and classroom 
climate-in influencing children's actions. The way in which social exchange 
interacts with materials that vary as a function of possibilities for 
manipulation could make an important contribution to the way in which we 
think about helping children to conserve meaning. In particular, findings that 
describe the conditions under which such sharing exists could inform the 
selection of tasks (play objects) available to children during free play. In this 
way it would be possible to provid young children in free play with a variety 
or tasks, each of which would chall nge the children in different ways. This 
would move away from our typical "bag of tricks" approach, in which a lot of 
play objects are provided but many appear to be overlapping in terms of 
potential actions afforded. Findings from this study should also enable us to 
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begin to document how malleable the child's logic, once developed, is-in 
other words, will the social context lead the child to change from one pattern 
of actions to another? Similarly, would altering the social context mean that 
the student's inability to focus on the "mathematics" of a mathematics task 
would be reorganized? 
It seems obvious that we first need to know something more about how the 
process of representation works and how it varies across tasks in order to 
answer questions about how representations are transformed. The Kaplan et 
al. paper argues for this kind of study. The Chaille and Freeman paper outlines 
the way in which such information is beginning to be detailed. The Beilin and 
Futterweit paper suggests ways in which differences in tasks might be 
conceptualized. 
In his paper, Winegar extends this discussion of representation and learning 
by considering both the social context within which representation occurs 
and the multiple ways in which we might assess learning. As he might suggest, 
decontextualizing processes of representation outside of a larger theoretical 
context may be an inappropriate goal. Rather, he argues for study of both 
actual and potential learning under conditions of both independence and 
assistance as contributing to a description of basic structures of development 
and how these hold across contexts. From this perspective, the study of 
context provides an opportunity to replicate and validate "prevailing patterns 
of complex processes." This tact emphasizes the importance of the 
precursors of emerging abilities and the potential role of context in facilitating 
their development. In terms of practice, such an approach renders terms such 
as "failure" meaningless and instead raises questions about the role of peer 
grouping ( or more generally, tasks which involve social exchange) in 
developing the child's ability to conserve meaning, to begin anticipating, to 
reconstruct alternatives to past action, and to transcend the task. 
What can the study of representation tell us about learning? Taken 
together, the present papers urge us to recognize the various dimensions of 
child-task engagement and the role of others in facilitating the child's 
emerging representational compentencies. They suggest that consideration 
of each child's actual level of development and past performance does not 
necessarily tell us about the child's potential performance. Rather, closer 
study of how children understand the tasks with which they are presented 
and the conditions of presentation may in fact yield more specificity about 
how to order tasks, when to present them and under what conditions, given 
individual children's emerging capabilities. Such information may also enable 
us to work better with students whose "faulty rules" (Ginsburg, 1982) have 
led them to make the tasks with which we present them into something other 
than that which we intended. Study of representation may mean that 
eventually learning will almost always include "the mathematics" intended 
by particular assignments. 
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